Defiance and Activism During the Daniel Moi Presidency in Kenya
According to Chege (2009), the
period between 1960s and 1990s witnessed immense activist activities in Kenya.
In the 1960s and 70s there were many reacting to the Kenyatta regimes excesses
while in the 1980s and 90s, there were also many reacting to the autocratic
rule of president Moi. Interesting, both the Kenyatta and Moi regimes are
considered to have been repressive and ruthless force was used to suppress any
dissent. However, despite the suppression, many forms of activism and activists
emerged prompted by the repressive nature of the regime.
Detention of Kenyans did not end with the colonialists.
Actually, the Kenyatta regime used colonial tactics of divide and rule,
ruthless suppression using the military and detention without trial to deal
with any form of dissent. Many scholars and political activists were detained
by the Kenyatta regime and detention continued with the introduction of Nyayo
torture chambers under the Moi regime (Wanyiri 1998: Kinyatti, 1987).
Moi had been thought to be a moderate politician that was
pro-democracy and socialist ideals (Kinyatti, 1987). However, the insecurity
arising from power struggle against the Kikuyu elite and the 1982 coup seemed
to have made President Moi borrow a leaf from the book of tyrannies. His regime
was largely characterized by patronage and sycophancy. Any suspicion of dissent
and state house operatives using the dreaded special branch would plot either
assassination or detention without trial of the subject.
The most vibrant academic activists
emerged in the 1960s and radical academic discourse was sustained until the
1990s. Many university lecturers and students were persecuted especially by the
Moi regime. Many academics were detained without trial by the Kenyatta and Moi
regime due to political activism. The state has always been suspicious towards
the academicians due to the influence and critical capacity that academicians
have.
During the Moi Era, narrates Chege (2009), scholars such as
Ngugi wa Thiongo, Maina wa Kinyatti and Abdilatif Abdalla joined political
prisoners such as Oginga Odinga, Martin Shikuku, Jean Marie Seroney, and Koigi
wa Mwere in detention for criticizing the administration. Others scholars that were detained or forced
into exile by Moi include Ngugi wa Thiongo, Alamin Mazrui, Edward Oyugi, Maina
Wa Kinyatti, Mukaru Ng‘ang‘a, Willy Mutunga, Katama Mkangi, Micere Mugo and E.S
Atieno Odhiambo.
The detentions were not limited to lecturers. Students were
not spared by the Kenyatta and Moi regime. Student agitation for better
governance was pronounced and thus government involvement in university student
affairs was high. There were government spies in universities, spying on the
lecturers as well as the students. Some of the students who were expelled from
university, detained and or had to run into exile included[1]
Mwandawiro Mghanga, Tirop arap Kitur, Peter Ogego, Adungosi, Gacheche wa Miano,
Other former university student leaders who were actively involved in activism
include James Orengo, Richard
Onyonka, P. L. O. Lumumba, David Murathe and a more recent one Hassan
Omar. P.L.O Lumumba was a prominent student leader but some accuse him of
having betrayed his colleagues. There were others like Karl Marx who was never
able to finish her studies.
During the Kenyatta and Moi regimes, many scholars and
students influenced particularly by the Marxist perspectives were concerned
about the welfare of the lower class (proletariat vs. bourgeois in Marxist
terminology). The academicians felt they had an important role to play in
showing the way on governance issues. According to Amutabi, the 1960s to the
1980s were the ―golden age of
the University of Nairobi, because discourse in the university was dynamic. The
university was “academically vibrant and tumultuous, a hub of political
activism”[2]
Discourse was not just advanced by university dons but their students were also
actively involved in public debate on political and economic issues. Most
students were keen on democratization and political reform as well as adoption
of sound economic policies.
1978- Moi Becoming President
The ascendancy of Moi to power
was seen as triumph of the smaller ethnic communities in Kenya. Moi was widely
thought to be a socialist at heart who believed in equity in distribution of
national resources. His presidency signaled the end of GEMA and Kiambu Mafia. President Kenyatta died in 1978 and left
behind a nation already operating on an ethnic logic. The Agikuyu (Kiambu
Mafia) and other GEMA communities had created the impression that without a
kikuyu, Kenya could not be governed. Using resources and influence amassed
during the Kenyatta Era, they were pulling all stops to ensure a Kikuyu took
the reins of power. When Moi succeeded Kenyatta, He was considered a passing
cloud that would disappear sooner rather than later.
1978- Moi released all of those held under Kenya's
detention laws.
One
of those released by Moi was Koigi Wa Wamwere[3]
1978- Disbandment of all ethnic associations
The
first stem Moi took to tame GEMA and Kiambu mafia was to ban all ethnic
associations in august 1978. All ethnic organizations including football clubs
that were ethnic based were disbanded. Gor Mahia rebranded from Luo Union and
AFC changed its name from Abaluhya Football Club
1978- Crackdown on Dissidents
Ensure
those against him do not mobilize any further, president Moi on November 3 1978 declared the
Preservation of Public Security Act without ratification by the Kenya
parliament. It institutes a state of emergency and leads to the arrest of
hundreds of political dissidents including university professors, students, and
journalists.
1979- General election
Once Moi took over power upon Kenyatta’s death, he was
elected as the President of Kanu on October 6, 1978 and became the sole party
candidate for the post of President. On October10, 1978 President Moi was sworn
in as Kenya's second president. Using his close allies, Kibaki and Njonjo, Moi
began to consolidate power both in Kanu and in government (Ingham, 1990:99).
Kenyatta had centralized power around the office of the president through the
provincial administration. Moi inherited this system and purposed to replace
officers in the system with those he considered as his allies. Ideologically,
Moi declared that he would follow in Kenyatta’s footsteps (Nyayo).
The 1979 elections were an important step in consolidating
Moi's position in KANU and Parliament. The KANU secretariat undertook to screen
and clear prospective candidates a process marked by conflicting positions
within the secretariat such that it was impossible for candidates to know
whether he had met the necessary requirements (Weekly Review 21/11/79). The
criterion for clearance was equally nebulous, as KANU's Organizing Secretary,
Nathan Munoko[4] put it
some of the conditions were:
(i)
Loyalty to KANU, the President and the
Country
(ii)
Popularity -the principle of all
acclamation
(iii)
Life membership to KANU was mandatory
prior to nomination, and
(iv)
Branch recommendation was mandatory.
In the 1979 General Elections, Odinga and his former KPU
associates were denied clearance despite having rejoined KANU - they failed the
"loyalty test" and the Secretary General Robert Matano declared them
security risks. Ex-KPU members attempted to sue the secretary general of KANU
but with a directive from Moi, all of them, Oginga Odinga, Tom Okello Odongo,
Acholla Mak Anyengo, Ochieng Oneko and Luke Obok were denied clearance. At the
1979 election, most of those who had been pro-change constitution movement lost
the seats. For the first time, people like Masinde Muliro lost his seat since
1957 when he had joined LEGICO (Wandiba, 1996). To neutralize Kikuyu influence
in cabinet, President Moi expanded the cabinet to accommodate regional and
ethnic representation. To appease Luo Nyanza, before the elections, Odinga was
appointed chairperson of Cotton Lint and Seed Marketing Board. He became a life
member of KANU but was not cleared to vie for a political position leading to
unrest and protests especially by university students (Ingham, 1990:107).
The 1980s
1980s- Economic Woes
In the early 1980s, evidence grew that the Kenyan state was
not a powerless tool of foreign multinationals but the puppet of domestic
capitalists, but in part an independent actor. Moi government’s control over
large and valuable set of assets left them vulnerable to exploitation by those
holding the levers of political power. Access to the resources that the state
commanded and the ability to direct them for personal gain and political
purposes was in fact a fundamental driver for competitive politics. State
resources were increasingly diverted into the parasitic sector, the off-book
sector of the economy in which insiders extracted resources from the state for
private benefit via bribery, abuses of procurement and benefits of office
It was widely believed, though un-provable, that by 1982 the
nexus of accumulation was shifting from the Kikuyu to the Kalenjin. Moi himself
was rapidly acquiring assets, generally in other names. Henry Cheboiwo bought a
controlling interest in a transport company in 1981. Asian executive Naushad
Merali and his company Sameer Investments, formed in 1983, almost immediately
acquired 51 per cent of the US Firestone Company in curious circumstances.
Local tyre dealers were refused foreign exchange to prevent counter-bid.
Sameer’s other directors were Kanyotu and a law firm that often acted as Moi’s
nominee.118
1980
-1982 Crackdowns
Despite Moi continuing to consolidate his position in Kanu
and in the state machinery, succession clamor was still rife in the country
because he was considered a mere “passing Cloud”. Njonjo at 60 in 1980 retired
from civil service and joined politics. His political maneuvers threatened
Kibaki who was the minister of Finance. In 1980, in a bid to win over the
country, Moi implemented populist programs such as FPE, free milk and banning
of ethnic associations. The ban on all ethnic associations targeted GEMA but
others like Luo East Africa, Akamba Association and Abaluyia East Africa were
also dissolved (Morton, 1998).
Due to factors beyond Moi’s control, e.g. Oil Crisis of the
70s and World Debt crisis of the 1980s, Kenya’s economy was declining (Morton,
1998). Against such a background, Moi had to deal with agitation from trade unions
but also academicians who blamed his approach for the dwindling economic gains.
Socialist leaning politicians like Odinga also kept criticizing the state
control approaches by Moi. Between 1980s and 1982, the government had started a
clampdown on critics. In May, 1982, Oginga Odinga was expelled from Kanu due to
his alleged divisive politics. Around May of 1982, many radical lecturers and
students were arrested and detained.
1982- Introduction of Section 2A
Up until July 1982, Kenya was a defacto one party state
(Morton, 1998). However, following attempts by Odinga and Anyona to register a
new party in June 1982, the government introduced an amendment and introduced
section 2A which made Kenya a de jure one party state. This meant that KANU was
the only legal political outfit and even independent candidates could not be
allowed in elections. To contest any election, one had to do so in KANU. The
opposition to this amendment led to Odinga being placed under house arrest
while Anyona, John Khaminwa (lawyer), Maina wa Kinyatti (lecturer) and David
Mukaru Ng’ang’a (lecturer) were detained (Kinyatti, 1987). The detentions led
to George Githii of the standard writing critical article that led to his being
fired from his job.
1981- Cooperative
Movement in Trouble
To reduce the politicization of the cooperative movement,
Moi demanded in late 1981 that all politicians resign from posts with the
unions, but this did not prevent them competing by proxy. During 1982, there
was a campaign against corruption in the movement and many cooperatives were
liquidated.
The cooperative movement also experienced problems,
including widespread allegations of malpractice and misuse of funds. Like most
other aspects of society, cooperative unions were best developed in Central Province,
which contained about one-third of rural cooperative members. Now, however,
reports emerged of the embezzlement of millions of shillings during the 1970s,
mostly in (not coincidentally) Central Province and Meru, and several
cooperative unions collapsed as a result. There were growing delays in the
payments to farmers, reflecting profitability and liquidity problems within the
marketing chain.
Despite Kenya’s difficulties, the best connected prospered.
Minister Oloitipitip, for example, boasted in 1982 that he could spend Ksh150
million (US$12 million) on his son’s wedding, and in a conflation of material
and affective assets, claimed in 1981 that independence had been so good for
him that he had ‘six cars, two big houses, 12 wives and 67 children’. Most
ministers, unlike backbenchers, soon became wealthy. Senior politicians and
civil servants took advantage of their positions to acquire land, take loans
without any intent to pay, and receive payments in return for political
protection.
1982- Corruption
in the Civil Service
Despite Njonjo’s promise in 1978 to ‘clean Kenya of
corruption’, it was worsened by Moi’s takeover, since a shakier president
needed to buy support more overtly. Efforts at cleaning up corruption during
1978–82, including pressure to reverse the Ndegwa Report and end civil
servants’ involvement in private business bore no fruit. During a debate in
1981, it emerged that civil servants, who had been required to declare their
interests in 1973 by the Ndegwa Report, had refused to do so unless politicians
were required to do the same. Shikuku quoted from a Sessional Paper on how far
the situation had already declined:
. . . Some
public servants utilize Government facilities in order to benefit themselves. Some are said to tender for Government
supplies and to see to it that their tenders are always successful. Others are said to be in the habit of
accepting rewards for work they are
paid to do by the Government.
In September 1982, the government again demanded civil
servants declare their interests. Again, it was ignored. A year later, the
government commissioned a National Code of Conduct, which yet again recommended
a register of interests, the abolition of civil servants’ right to engage in
private business, the appointment of an ombudsman and the sacking of officials
under investigation for misdeeds. As usual, though, nothing was done. Talk was
easy, but real action was to take another 20 years.
There was also evidence that the Harambee movement
was becoming an informal taxation system: chiefs were extorting money for
unspecified projects, while Harambee committees embezzled funds.
Although Harambee was a devolved local development scheme, from which
the poor benefited in general more than the rich, there was as much politics as
ever and less voluntarism.
1982- Coup attempt in August
On
1st of August 1982, there was a coup attempt by disaffected
soldiers, allegedly supported by Odinga and other Luo and Kikuyu politicians. Over
1,000 members of the armed forces were court-martialed over the incident. In
the aftermath, hundreds of Kenyans considered opposed to the Moi regime was
detained without trial. Additionally,
there was a crackdown on universities, some 80-university students were
arrested, and some detained. The coup attempt is a turning point because it
gave president Moi an excuse for the tight hold on security and limiting of
freedoms that followed. Moi banned trade and professional unions and suppressed
strikes and protests by doctors, bank employees, industrial workers, and
students
1983- General Elections
Still in reaction to the coup and the air of suspicion in
the aftermath, Moi called for early elections on September 16, 1983 (Munene,
2001). Kenya being a de-jure one party state meant that anybody contesting in
the election had to be a KANU loyalist. Contestants had to seek clearance from
KANU headquarters. Individuals had to pay a nomination fee of 1000 and submit
to the president a complete pledge of loyalty. In this election Odinga allies
were denied clearance save for Ochieng Oneko and Luke Obok. The 1983 elections
were characterized by apathy with only 48% of eligible voters turning out to
vote (Munene, 2001).
The fall of Njonjo in the run up to the 1983 elections had
created fears in central province that Moi was systematically neutralizing all
the powerful Kikuyu politicians. Therefore, there were fears that Kibaki would
be next on line after he had been moved from the prestigious finance ministry.
To appease the kikuyu, Moi appointed Kibaki Vice President after the elections
.Moi reshuffled cabinet in June 1983 and later in July; the 10 men found guilty
of leading the coup d’état were executed.
1984
– Wajir Massacre
1985
– Ban on Media Broadcast of KANU events
In
1985 Hilary Ng’weno editor of Weekly
Review forced to apologize for covering national events for having reported
KANU events that had turned acrimonious.
1985- The Ouster of Njonjo
Since the death of Kenyatta, Njonjo had been a
key ally of President Moi. However, conspiracy had it that he hoped to dislodge
Moi and become president. Politicians such as Chotara and Kubai, and Elijah
Mwangale worked on such a conspiracy to get Njonjo dismissed
1983-
1986- Mwakenya Movement
The actions of security and state house
machinery engulfed Kenya in a cloud of fear. Consequently, critics of the
government had to operate in a covert manner or under cover. There emerged a
secret movement called MWAKENYA. The Movement was publishing articles
and pamphlets analyzing and criticizing the government. The crackdowns on
Universities led to underground efforts to expose the ills of the regime. To be
found with any publication that was considered as opposing government
establishment was a seditious felony. A case in hand is a lady who was jailed
simply for having been found with a document that related the happenings during
the 1982 coup[5]
The crackdown targeted university lecturers,
journalists and publishers. In 1986, there
was an arrest of hundreds of journalists, teachers, students and civil
servants. Few arrests were made public, following a ban in July that year on
reporting by Kenyan journalists of all arrests and trials carried out on
political grounds. None of those arrested and subsequently charged was allowed
access to legal counsel. Among the journalists arrested was Wahome Mutahi with
his brother Njuguna Mutahi. They were detained in Nyayo House torture chambers
charged with sedition and alleged association with Mwakenya movement and later
transferred to Kamiti Maximum Security Prison.
1986- KANU Disciplinary Committee created[6]
The
disciplinary committee formed by president Moi on 17th December 1986
was a very powerful entity that ensured minimal defiance within the ruling
party. The committee struck dread into the hearts of many, ruins careers, build
others and even ignore the protection accorded to MPs by the Constitution. So
powerful was it that in just one-and-a-half years, Moi thought it was trying to
usurp his powers.
1986- Constitutional Amendment Bill of 1986
This
bill eliminated provisions for security of tenure of attorney general,
controller, and auditor general. Consequently, such officers worked at the
behest of president Moi and KANU henchmen and women.
1987- Gitobu Imanyara launched the Nairobi Law
Monthly
The Nairobi Monthly among other
publications became a tool that activists used to criticize Moi. Nairobi Law
Monthly was
a vehicle through which lawyers
could exchange ideas and communicate with the outside world. The law society of
Kenya was powerful and looked at suspiciously by Moi government
1987- Enactment of the Sectional Properties
Act, Cap 286 of Laws of Kenya
Its main provisions were to facilitate registration of the
sectional plan under the Registered Land
Act Cap 300 of Laws of Kenya, make Sectional Plans a requirement to support
titles to parts of buildings and to be the substantive law governing the rights
of proprietors having interests in or rights over sectional properties.
1987- Opposition to Mulolongo Voting System
In 1987, Mulolongo system was proposed to replace secret
ballot in the 1988 elections. NCCK and LSK led opposition against the Queuing
system. The Mulolongo system ensured candidates preferred by the party and
branch chairpersons sailed through in elections. Due to Mulolongo, the 1988
General elections was a farce because the Executive determined who won in the
elections (Nyong’o, 1993:32). The National Council of Churches of
Kenya (NCCK) and The Law Society of Kenya protest queuing system of elections
(mulolongo)
1987- Vice
president Josephat Karanja expelled from KANU.
Internal
fighting within KANU led to explusiion of Josephat Karanja. He was accused of behaving like an acting President;
President Moi let it be known that he was Head of State even when in the air. Others expelled
included lawyer Kimani wa Nyoike and two members of Parliament, Kenneth Matiba
and Charles Rubia, who were
both later detained.
1988-
Reverend Timothy Njoya
Dr. Timothy Njoya is an outspoken
critic of the Kenyan government on issues of corruption, injustice and
democratization[7]. He has
also played an instrumental role in the formation of an opposition party in the
country
He has served in different parishes
including Chuka, Tumutumu, Mathari, St. Andrews, Dagoretti, and currently at
Kinoo PCEA parish. Njoya started to publicly protest the Kenyan government's
autocracy and injustice when he was serving at St. Andrews, next to Nairobi
University. He attacked the single party state and advocated multipartism in
his sermons, strongly defending the freedom of expression and association
granted in the constitution.
He was arrested on several occasions. Government officials told him to "leave politics to politicians" and politicians condemned his views whenever possible, making him more popular with the masses. The fact that the press popularized Njoya's ideas was a constant source of trouble for him. For instance, he was arrested briefly in 1988 for a sermon that proposed the holding of a large kamukunji, or council, with amnesty for the country's dissidents, to give all a chance to talk.
He was arrested on several occasions. Government officials told him to "leave politics to politicians" and politicians condemned his views whenever possible, making him more popular with the masses. The fact that the press popularized Njoya's ideas was a constant source of trouble for him. For instance, he was arrested briefly in 1988 for a sermon that proposed the holding of a large kamukunji, or council, with amnesty for the country's dissidents, to give all a chance to talk.
1988- Constitutional amendment removes security of
tenure of judges
As
Makau Mutua[8]
explains the judiciary is supposed to be the
guarantor of any legal system. The Kenyan legal system is composed of the
judiciary, law enforcement agencies, the Office of the Attorney General, and
the private bar organized under the auspices of the Law Society of Kenya (LSK).
The passage of the detention law in 1966 started a broad but steady attack on
the rule of law and integrity of the judiciary and the legal system. In 1988,
President Moi prevailed over the rubber stamp Parliament to pass a
constitutional amendment with far-reaching implications for judicial
independence and respect for human rights in Kenya. In a stunning act of
docility, the KANU Parliament removed the security of tenure for judges. It
also extended from twenty-four hours to fourteen days the period during which
suspects in capital cases could be held without charge
1988- Licensing of lawyers reviewed and an attack on
LSK
Still
in 1988, the procedure of acquiring a practicing license for lawyers was
changed to allow government more control over licensing of lawyers. Through LSK
lawyers had become very vocal and were using the courts to fight injustices by
the Moi regime
1988-
Raila Odinga Detained again
In September of 1988, Seven months after being released from
a six year prison term, Raila Odinga, the leader of the unpublicized Kenya
Revolutionary Movement (KRM), is again detained
1989
– Bishop Gitari attacked in church[9]
He was one of the Gikuyu voices of
reason who sided with poor youth against the well-oiled Gikuyu
religious leaders who supported Gema. The legacy he left will be remembered for
ages especially his fight for the return of multi party democracy end to
corruption and other social ills that plagued Kenya. The third Arch
Bishop of the Anglican Church Dr David Mukuba Gitari used his pulpit to lead
his flock as well as the political class
The 1990s
1989
-1990- Clamor for multiparty democracy
Former
detainees and KANU rejects or rebels engaged the government in a sustained
effort for the repeal of section 2A of the constitution. This processes
involved the efforts of Martin Shikuku, Kimani wa Nyoike, and Masinde Muliro,
Rubia and Matiba were the central figures in the main, elite-directed
opposition to the Moi government among others.
This
period was also characterized by sustained efforts to clampdown on dissidents.
Trials and imprisonments of alleged dissidents continued. Those associated with
the clandestine opposition movement Mwakenya, and two other unpublicized
groups, the KRM and the Kenya Patriotic Front (KPF) were among those targeted.
Equally, Moi banned newspapers and magazines including Beyond, Financial
Review, Development Agenda, and the Daily Nation. Some of those detained
without trial in 1990 were Charles Rubia and Kenneth Matiba despite Moi
releasing political prisoners in June 1989.
1990s- Economic Woes; Goldenberg scandal
The Goldenberg scandal was a political scandal where the
Kenyan government was found to have subsidized exports of gold far beyond
standard arrangements during the 1990s, by paying the company Goldenberg
International 35% more (in Ksh.) than their foreign currency earnings. Although
it notionally appears that the scheme was intended to earn hard currency for
the country, it is estimated to have cost Kenya the equivalent of more than 10%
of the country's annual Gross Domestic Product, and it is possible that no or
minimal amounts of gold were actually exported. The scandal appears to have
involved political corruption at the highest levels of the government of Daniel
Moi. Officials in the former government of Mwai Kibaki have also been
implicated; Moi himself however is not featuring anywhere.
1990- The
Land Disputes Tribunal Act (No. 18)
This Act provided land disputes resolution mechanism. It
empowered various entities and limited their powers on resolving disputes. It
amended the Registered Land Act, 1963 and was later repealed by the Environment
and Land Court Act, 2011 and the Land Registration Act, 2012
1990 - Death of Dr. Robert Ouko
On 13 February 1990, Robert Ouko, a former foreign minister
who had criticized the Moi regime was found dead. The death sparked widespread
anti-government protests by students claiming that the government is covering
up the circumstances of his death. The government bans demonstrations. The
Death of Ouko led to protests across the country. Ouko’s death as well as death
of Eldoret Bishop Alexander Muge, then an outspoken critic of President Moi,
and the continued ruthless suppression of political dissent are some of the
factors happenings that heightened defiance. The deaths and arrest of senior
political activists led to demonstrations and key among them was the saba saba
riots.
1990- Kamukunji Rally: Saba Saba Day riots (July)[10]
On 4 July, former Cabinet ministers
Kenneth Matiba and Charles Rubia, and then political activist Raila Odinga,
were arrested and detained on July 4 of that year for demanding the
re-introduction of multi-party democracy[11]. At that time, the repression by President
Daniel arap Moi’s regime was at its peak. The Cold War had collapsed and many
Africa strongmen, including Moi, found themselves under pressure from donors
and development partners in the West, as well as from homegrown movements, to
allow multi-party democracy.
The arrest of Rubia, Matiba,
and Raila were to pre-empt a rally that had been planned by opposition leaders
at the Kamkunji grounds in Nairobi on July 7[12].
The rally had been baptized Saba Saba. The group was led by Jaramogi Oginga
Odinga, Masinde Muliro, Timothy Njoya, James Orengo, Paul Muite, Gitobu
Imanyara, and Martin Shikuku, among others, to press for greater democratic
space and a stop to human rights abuses ( Murungi, 2000).
Despite the ban by the
government, thousands of Kenyans marched in defiance of a previously
unchallengeable regime to make their way to Nairobi’s Kamukunji grounds to
press the case for democracy. The name Saba Saba (Seven Seven) was borrowed
from Tanzania, where it marked the date the defunct liberation party,
Tanganyika African National Union (Tanu), was formed. That was on July 7,
1954. In Kenya, Saba Saba was used as the beginning of open defiance
against the Moi government to give room to democratic reforms. The government
ruthlessly crushed the demonstrations.
The
Kamukunji rally was a turning point in agitation for greater democratic space.
It involved defying orders of police and carrying out a banned rally. Former
detainees and KANU rejects or rebels engaged the government in a sustained
effort for the repeal of section 2A of the constitution. This processes
involved the efforts of Martin Shikuku, Kimani wa Nyoike, and Masinde Muliro,
Rubia and Matiba were the central figures in the main, elite-directed
opposition to the Moi government among others[13].
This
period was also characterized by sustained efforts to clampdown on dissidents.
Trials and imprisonments of alleged dissidents continued. Those associated with
the clandestine opposition movement Mwakenya, and two other unpublicized
groups, the KRM and the Kenya Patriotic Front (KPF) were among those targeted.
Equally, Moi banned newspapers and magazines including Beyond, Financial
Review, Development Agenda, and the Daily Nation (Murungi, 2000). Some of those
detained without trial in 1990 were Charles Rubia and Kenneth Matiba despite
Moi releasing political prisoners in June 1989.
1990-
Arrest and Trial of The Anyona Four
Four days after the Saba Saba
Rally, Prof Ngotho, George Anyona, Prof Edward Oyugi, and Njeru Kathangu, were
arrested at Mitugi Bar in Dagoretti as they had a drink. They were later jailed
for seven years each amid a local and international outcry. The so-called
“Anyona Four” provided one of the most sensational political trials in Kenya in
the early 1990s[14].
1990- Bishop Henry Okullu[15]
Bishop Henry Okullu was an
Anglican bishop with plenty of fire in his belly, and not even threats from the
State would reduce him to silence (Okullu, 1997). The late Bishop John Henry
Okullu of the Anglican Church is remembered as a fierce critic of the
government in the 1990s. Unwavering, he issued sermons agitating for human
rights, justice and multi-party system of government. His sermons offered the
first unequivocal endorsement of a multi-party system in Kenya by a religious
leader[16]
1991- Donor Pressure
The
deaths and arrests in 1990 and resultant demonstrations, which prompted further
suppression by the regime led to international community being concerned. In
November 1991, donors' had a meeting in Paris
and suspended most government-to-government economic assistance, pending
improved respect for civil liberties and a clear reduction in levels of
corruption; the International Monetary Fund followed suit and stopped giving
Kenya loans in December 1991
1991- NGO Coordination Act
The government had endeavored since 1969 to enable but
control civil society organizations and workers unions; for instance maendeleo
ya wanawake and central organization for trade unions. The end of the cold war
and America’s focus on democratization led to international funding being available
for local civic organizations. In 1991 through the NGO Co-ordination Act, the
Government sought to reduce and regulate the number and activities of NGOs.
However, this has not reduced the efficacy of new NGOs organize and get mass
appeal.
1991-
Repeal of Section 2A
On
December 3, 1991, Moi announces that new political parties will be allowed to register. In August 1991, the multi-party agitators formed a unified
political grouping and called it Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (Ford).
The six founder members and patrons were Martin Shikuku, Jaramogi Oginga
Odinga, Ahmed Bahmariz, Philip Gachoka, George Nthenge, and Masinde Muliro.
Supporters of democracy saw Ford as the outfit to remove Kanu from power and
consign years of political dictatorship to the dustbin of history. It was not
to be because of two factors. First, the Ford leaders were in a hurry to get
power and forgot to initiate further constitutional and institutional reforms
that could have allowed a level playing field. Secondly, internal squabbles
brought about by personal and ethnic scramble for power.
The repeal of section 2A and resultant multi-party
politics changed the political landscape. However, for survival the Kanu regime
resorted to divide and rule politics along ethnic lines. In March of 1992,
there were Reports
of ethnic violence in the press. The Kalenjin Assistant Minister Kipkalia Kones
declares Kericho District a KANU zone. President Moi visiting an area like
Bungoma. The government accused the opposition parties of fueling the violence
through Libyan-trained recruits and opposition leaders accuse the government of
orchestrating ethnic violence in order to weaken moves towards multi-party
politics. President Moi then prohibited
all political rallies, citing the threat of tribal violence
In
the run up to and after the 1992 elections, violence erupted in various parts
of the country. The violence in the Rift Valley continued unabated throughout
1993. The Uasin Gishu, Trans Nzoia, Bungoma, and Nakuru Districts were the most
affected. Fighting in the Burnt Forest area in Uasin Gishu pitted the Kalenjin
against the Kikuyu community. At the coast, there were clashes in Likoni. All
the violence was politically instigated but with land as the emotive issue
1991- Political Parties Allowed to Register
Moi
arrests Nicholas Biwott, former minister of energy, on suspicion that Biwott had
personally appropriated foreign aid and participated in the murder of Robert
Ouko, the late minister for foreign affairs. On December 3, Moi announces that
new political parties will be allowed
to register
1991- Formation of FORD
In August 1991, the multi-party
agitators formed a unified political grouping and called it Forum for the
Restoration of Democracy (Ford). The six founder members and patrons were
Martin Shikuku, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, Ahmed Bahmariz, Philip Gachoka, George
Nthenge, and Masinde Muliro. Supporters of democracy saw Ford as the outfit to
remove Kanu from power and consign years of political dictatorship to the
dustbin of history. It was not to be because of two factors. First, the Ford
leaders were in a hurry to get power and forgot to initiate further
constitutional and institutional reforms that could have allowed a level
playing field. Secondly, internal squabbles brought about by personal and
ethnic scramble for power.
1991- Rebellion in Kanu
In
late December, several cabinet ministers resign to protest the president's
failure to call elections within KANU
1992-
Majimboist Rhetoric and the 1St Election Related Violence
To challenge KANU, was portrayed by Moi and state machinery
as a challenge to the Kalenjin and allied tribes (Barkan, 1993). Therefore,
through ethnicisation of politics, Kanu perpetuated itself. Equally, the
opposition in Kenyan politics has always mobilized on ethnic grounds. Never in
Kenyan politics, has politics been purely issue based. In every election, there
is ethnic arithmetic that is done by the leaders. This kind of scenario finds
foundations in the pre-colonial set up, which was adopted and used by the
colonialists.
Elite within KANU thrived on political favors and government
contracts. Therefore growing rich in Kenya is not tied to innovation and
entrepreneurship but rather to state connections and patronage (Barkan, 1993).
Consequently, controlling state house is directly linked to elite prosperity
chances as well as livelihood opportunities of people at the grassroots.
The 1992 and 1997 elections were marred by ethnic violence.
The violence was believed to be state sponsored in a bid to discredit the
multi-party system of government (Barkan, 1993). In 1997 when Moi won the
election and Kibaki Moved to Court, the Kalenjin in the rift valley started
mobilizing for retribution against the kikuyu (Daily Nation 23 January 1998).
Kalenjin leaders interpreted the court case as an affront not just on MOI but
also the Kalenjin Community. There were a series of attacks and revenge attacks
as reported in the daily nation of 27 January 1998.
The problem in Kenyan politics has been the notion that
political leaders represent the ethnic communities. This notion has its roots
in the colonial period where ethnicity was the basis of engagement with
citizens by the colonial administration. The colonialists profiled ethnic
communities and supported traditional leaders or instituted chiefs who governed
over an ethnic group. Initial anti-colonial administration associations were
also ethnic based. The first political parties in Kenya were also ethnic based
and only KANU and later NARC were parties that transcended ethnic divide.
However, even in those outfits, ethnic arithmetic defined engagement among the
leaders.
Political tribalism has existed in Kenya. However, the
repeal of section 2A and resultant multi-party politics usher in a new era in
Kenya characterized by ethnic militants (tribal resistance and violence)
(Klopp, 2001). Immediately after the repeal of section, 2A there emerged in
Kenya regional balkanization and ethnic resistance to influence by leaders from
enemy ethnic groups. Initially, ethnicisation of politics was restricted to
bargaining for space at the eating table by the leaders. However, in the 1990s,
ethnic communities became the armies by which leaders could grab political
power or defend themselves against attack. State organized violence defines the
beginning of politics related ethnic violence in Kenya.
Nicholas Biwott is viewed by many as having been at the
centre of state bankrolled ethnic violence in the rift valley. In the run up to
actual violence, Kanu MPs and Ministers started drumming support for Majimboism
as agitation for multi-party politics heightened. The majimboism rhetoric
raised the question of indigenous communities vs. those that did not belong to
given areas. This was a return to the pre-independence demand by KADU for a
federal system of government. The pre-independence jostling for Majimboism was
driven by fear of Kikuyu domination in the independence government
(Atieno-Odhiambo 2000: 24). Thus, Moi and his cronies re-ignited the Majimbo
rhetoric to create the sentiment that minority groups in Kenya needed
protection and left to multi-party politics, they would easily be dominated.
This evoked the desire for freedom from domination by other ethnic groups.
Other ethnic groups were now looked at, especially in the Rift Valley, as the
enemy keen on exploiting what is not originally since they were not indigenous
members.
The Weekly Review 23
of August 1991 captures the dominant arguments for and against Majimbo then.
While Kanu lieutenants were propagating the Majimbo gospel, FORD was against
the Majimboist rhetoric because it eroded national unity. The Majimboist
rhetoric effectively aroused the notion of marginalization and historical
injustices. Many in the rift valley believed the Kenyatta government had been
unfair in the way it tackled the land question. Areas like the coast, North
Eastern Kenya and even Pockets of western easily bought into the
marginalization rhetoric. It is in the 1990s that majimboist sentiments led to
emergence of KAMATUSA (Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu) as the original
and bonafide owners of the rift valley.
In the pre-independence discussion of Majimbo, there were
desires of self-governance and freedom from domination by other ethnicities.
However, the new wave of majimboist rhetoric was driven by marginalization and
historical injustice notions that evoked bitter feelings and desire for justice
among communities. There was a general feeling that the Kenyatta regime had
favored the Kikuyu in buying land from the white settlers. Additionally, there
was a feeling that a community like the Kalenjin had benefited and was thus
being protected by Moi. Removing Moi posed a danger of the community being
targeted and being marginalized. On the other hand, other communities felt it
is Kikuyu and Kalenjin that had benefited under successive KANU regimes.
Therefore, the only way of safeguarding interests was ethnic unity and electing
a government that had community interests catered for through representation.
Generally, the Kalenjin felt the Kikuyu had invaded their
lands. They lived all over the country and ran business without qualms. On the
other hand, there was a perception that the Kikuyu were selfish and did not
welcome members of other tribes. It was rumored that the Kikuyu did not allow
people from other communities to do business or to settle in central province.
They would either not buy or simple murder the intruder. While the Kalenjin and
other communities felt they had been invaded, the Kikuyu intellectuals ran a
liberalist propaganda that emphasized the right of every citizen to live, work
and settle anywhere in the country.
By rekindling the Majimboism debate, ethnic arithmetic was
no longer just a matter of political mobilization among the elites but a matter
of justice as members of given communities felt having been exploited and
dominated by members of some other communities. In the rift valley, Mps openly
advised their people to take arms and defend their rights. The weekly review of
27 September 1991 quotes then Kapktet MP encouraging his audience to take up
arms and protecting what is rightfully theirs. Imanyara and Maina (1991:20)
quote Biwott extolling the courage of Kalenjins arguing that they were warriors
who would not be taken out of power without a fight.
In March of
1992, there were Reports
of ethnic violence in the press. The Kalenjin Assistant Minister Kipkalia Kones
declares Kericho District a KANU zone and states that the Kalenjin youth in the
area have declared war on the Luo community in retaliation for several
Kalenjins killed in earlier violence. The government accused the opposition
parties of fueling the violence through Libyan-trained recruits and opposition
leaders accuse the government of orchestrating ethnic violence in order to
weaken moves towards multipartyism.
President Moi then prohibited all political rallies, citing the threat
of tribal violence
In
the run up to and after the 1992 elections, violence erupted in various parts
of the country. The violence in the Rift Valley continued unabated throughout
1993. The Uasin Gishu, Trans Nzoia, Bungoma, and Nakuru Districts were the most
affected. Fighting in the Burnt Forest area in Uasin Gishu pitted the Kalenjin
against the Kikuyu community. At the coast, there were clashes in Likoni. All
the violence was politically instigated but with land as the emotive issue
1993-1997
– Opposition Politics and CSOs
About
40 local and international NGOs based in Kenya were engaged in political
activism. Some were concerned with violence while others focused on human
rights abuses by the government. The civil society worked closely with
opposition politicians in checking the excesses of the Moi regime. Individuals and religious bodies'
representatives met to discuss the situation of peace in Kenya. The meeting was
an outgrowth of Peace Net, founded in September 1993 as the Ethnic Clashes
Network, as a response to ethnic violence. The leaders express their fear of
renewed clashes, concern over the culture of violence taking over the country,
and the need for “concerted effort to restore peace and stability to Kenya.”[17]
They warn that the “level of violence-political and otherwise-appears to
escalate as we approach the 1997 election year
1994- Maathai vs. City Council of Nairobi
In 1994 there was
a landmark ruling in the case of Maathai vs. City Council Of Nairobi; HCCC
No.72 of 1994, when the Registration
of Titles Act Cap 281 of Laws of Kenya was applied and an indefeasible title was not
subject to be challenged. The piece of land could not be sold to an individual.
1996- The
Physical Planning Act; Cap 86 of Laws of Kenya
The act was enacted to consolidate earlier laws,
which dealt with physical development in urban and rural areas. The Act
repealed the Town Planning Act; Cap 134 of Laws of Kenya and the Land Planning
Act, 1970. The other legislation that came into existence was the Land Lord and
Tenant Act, 1996 (Shops,
Hotels and Catering Establishments;
Cap 301 of Laws of Kenya which governed the relationship between the land lord
and tenant, the various types of tenancies and the legal avenues to resolve
disputes. This Act has not been repealed and is still in operation to date.
1997
Election related Clashes
Despite the work of
NGO or civil society organizations, the culture of violence had been entrenched
and widespread clashes were witnessed before and after the 1997 elections. Due
to ethnic mobilization, politicians pitted one ethnic group against others. Ethnic violence in 1992 and 1997 and later 2007 took the
form of ethnic cleansing or purifications (Klopp, 2001). For the first time, in
the run up to 1992 elections, people see their neighbors from other tribes as strangers,
invaders and intruders. All problems faced at the individuals and community
level are subsumed into an ethnic problem. The idea is that, to triumph over
given tribes and driving them as far away as possible is the sure way of
solving socio-economic problem. Politicians to rally people and reduce
competition propagated these sentiments. Nationally, it was an attempt by KANU
to ensure politicians from especially the kikuyu community are mistrusted. In
1992, the main challenger to Moi was Kenneth Matiba a kikuyu. In 1997, the main
challenger was Kibaki thus fueling animosity between Kalenjin and Kikuyu.
Akiwumi Commission of Ethnic Clashes and the Human Rights
Watch Report of 1993 demonstrated abundantly that violence in the county was
state sponsored. The Majimboist sentiment led to ethnic purification in Nyanza,
western, Rift Valley and at the coast with the Likoni area being hard hit by
violence as well as Mt. Elgon, Burnt forest areas and Molo. Ethnic
balkanization began with KANU but was easily adopted by all politicians in the
country (Klopp, 2002). There were areas that were declared KANU zones and an
opposition leader going there would be met with violence. Equally, opposition
leaders also arranged violence to deter other candidates from campaigning in
their area. To date, each political leader has an ethnic constituency and even
the president cannot just walk into any area and address a rally. In the recent
past, President Uhuru had to cancel a trip to Ukambani (Kitui) because the
local leaders had not been consulted.
1997
– Kirwa Incident
On 9th April 1997 - KANU parliamentarian
Kipruto arap Kirwa, who had launched a verbal attack against President Moi two
weeks earlier, disappeared fueling
suspicions that he has been arrested for his outspokenness. Dissatisfaction
with Moi within the Kalenjin community was most evident among the Nandi, the
sub-group to which Kirwa belongs and among other members of the KANU alliance
1999- The
Njonjo Land Commission
The main aim of the commission was to come up with
principles of a National Land Policy.
The Commission was under Charles Njonjo and was supposed to establish the
position of the constitution on land and make proposals of how to entrench land
law in the legal system.
2001-
KPC Ngong Forest Land Scandal (DN Wednesday, 20th October, 2010)
The KPC Scandal
was a scandal that resulted in the suspension in October 2012 of Kenyan
Government Minister William Ruto who was charged in court as a result. Mr Ruto
and four other persons faced fraud charges over the alleged sale of a piece of
land in Ngong forest to Kenya Pipeline Company (KPC) for Shs.272 million. The
minister allegedly received Sh96 million at various intervals during the
alleged transaction.
In the case, Mr. Ruto and Berke Commercial Agencies, a
company associated with him, Mr Joshua Kulei, a former aide of retired
president Daniel Moi, Mr Sammy Mwaita (the Member of Parliament for Baringo
Central Constituency) and two other firms were sued for allegedly obtaining
money from KPC between 6 August and 6 September 2001. In April 2011, Mr. Ruto
was acquitted of the Sh43 million land fraud charges for lack of evidence after
the prosecution failed to produce in court the then Finance Manager Hellen Njue
to give her evidence on how she paid out the money. His co-accused, Mr Joshua
Kulei and Mr Sammy Mwaita, were also set free.
[1] Students expelled or detained
were detailed by Shaila Wambui in a Daily Nation article on November 28,
1992
[2] An article in Kenya Times, by
Etende Embeywa, November 27 1992 offers insight into political activism by
university dons between 1960s and 1990s. While Etende was pro government
apologists another article by Odegi-Awuondo, in a Daily Nation article
on November 24, 1992 was pro the radical scholars
[3] More is narrated by Wamwere
(2000) in his autobiography
[4] Quoted by Ogot 1995
[5]
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000091109/mwakenya-movement-and-dark-days-of-single-party-rule
[6]
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000093759/powerful-disciplinary-committee-that-terrorised-leaders
[7]
http://www.dacb.org/stories/kenya/njoya_timothy.html
[8]
http://www.iupui.edu/~anthkb/a104/kenya/justice%20under%20siege.htm
[9]
http://ntv.nation.co.ke/news2/topheadlines/remembering-a-hero-bishop-gitari-supported-enactment-of-the-constitution/
[10]
http://www.nation.co.ke/lifestyle/DN2/Kenya-Multiparty-politics/-/957860/2020838/-/wjuspcz/-/index.html
[11] Idem
[12] Idem
[13] Idem
[14]
http://www.nation.co.ke/lifestyle/DN2/Kenya-Multiparty-politics/-/957860/2020838/-/wjuspcz/-/index.html
[15]
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/kenyaat50/article/2000104598/bishop-okullu-a-man-of-god-with-a-heart-for-justice
[16] Idem
[17] Klopp, 2002
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